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Abstract
This study uses a survey experimental approach in order to quan-
tify concerns for relative position in rural and urban Uganda along
the dimensions of income, education and weddings. Positionality was
found to be overall low. Income and education are more positional
among urban dwellers and weddings were on average twice as posi-
tional as income and education. The rural-urban differences are found
to be partly due to differences in wealth.
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1 Introduction
People are largely influenced by other people in almost every aspect of their
lives. Others influence our mental and physical state of being, and they
largely influence our decision making. This study measures how strongly
people in Uganda care about being ahead of others, how strongly they prefer
to be in a better position relative others, how strongly they care about their
status.
Positionality is the term that is used to denote concern for relative po-
sition or status. Positional actions are actions aimed at increasing or main-
taining one’s relative position in society and positional goods are goods that
are consumed in order to increase or maintain one’s relative position.
It is a common assumption that relative concerns only matter for the rich
and wealthy and that poor people only care about their absolute position,
since they literally “Have to get food on their plate.”. However, as Banjeree
and Duflo (2007) point out, even the poorest of the poor spend considerable
amounts of their income on goods like alcohol, cigarettes and festivals. These
are goods that very well might be positional.
In order to investigate relative concerns among the poor, I conducted a
survey experiment in rural and urban Uganda that measures positionality
along three dimensions: Income, education and weddings. Through this,
this study aims to contribute to the answers of the following questions. How
positional are people in Uganda? Are there goods that are highly positional?
Is positionality higher in urban than in rural areas? What makes people or
what people are more positional?
2 Previous work
The importance of relative income or consumption and status concerns for
economic decision making has long not received wide attention in main-
stream economics, although many classical economists realized their impor-
tance. Veblen (1899) is often cited as the first thoroughly economic analysis
of peoples concern for status. In this work he analysed what he termed
conspicuous consumption, the visible consumption of luxury goods in order
to get or maintain status. Other early works include Duesenberry (1949),
Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and Pollak (1976).
In the field of happiness economics there has in recent years been a sub-
stantial amount of research on the relative aspects of utility. Early, it was
concluded that relative comparisons are important for well-being, and the
including of a relative term in the utility function helps to explain many puz-
zles in the empirical literature (see Clark et al. 2008 for a survey). The early
seminal work, whose revival in the 1990s sparked much of the recent research
interest, was Easterlin (1974). The Easterlin paradox, that rich countries are
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happier compared to poorer countries, but within a rich country more income
doesn’t increase happiness, can easily be explained by including a relative
term in the utility function.
More recent studies have examined the question of exactly how important
relative income is in developed countries. Some survey studies indicated that
income was completely relativistic in North America and Europe, see for
example Clark and Oswald (1996). Two recent large cross-country studies
are Caporale et al. (2009) and Corazzini et al. (2012), and further references
are Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005) and McBride (2001).
Several studies have used a survey experimental1 approach in order to
quantify the importance of relative income and consumption. Solnick &
Hemenway (1998, 2005) and Solnick et al. (2007) do this by asking people
to choose between a positional and an unpositional alternative. Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2002) refines this method by letting people make repeated
choices between an unpositional and an increasingly positional alternative.
This method has further been used to measure positionality in different coun-
tries and for different goods, and this is also the method used in this study.
Carlsson et al. (2007) studies a random sample of the Swedish popula-
tion. Solnick & Hemenway (1998, 2005), Solnick et al. (2007), and Alpizar
et al. (2005) also investigated the positional concerns over other goods than
income.
Recently, positional concerns in less developed countries have received
attention. Studies using happiness data include among others Kingdon and
Knight (2007) in South Africa, Knight et al. (2009) and Knight and Gu-
natilaka (2010) for rural China, Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2009) for South
Africa and Akay and Martinsson (2011) for rural Ethopia. Charles et al.
(2009) use expenditure data to study conspiciuous consumption in South
Africa and Brown et al. do it for rural China. Suvey experiments where
made by Alpizar et al. (2005) with Costa Rican students, Carlsson et al.
(2007) studied Vietnamese farmers, Carlsson et al. (2008) Indian students
and Akay et al. (2011) Ethopian farmers. While poorer people in general are
shown to care less about relative income (Carlsson et al. 2007, Akay et al.
2011), positionality might still be relevant and even of high importance for
certain goods. However, except for Akay et al. (2011), who look at income
from aid projects, there is not much research trying to directly measure posi-
tionality for a wider range of goods in less developed countries. Examples of
goods that might be positional include designer labels (van Kempen 2003),
funerals (Case et al. 2008), brides (Anderson 2007) and gifts (Yan 1996).
Relative concerns and the interdependent preferences that result from
them have important implications for public policy and many theoretical
1The term survey experiment is used to distinguish these experiments from other ex-
periments, which are usually incentivised. The only experimental study on this subject
known to the author is McBride (2010).
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models have been proposed to assess its effects. Positionality results in an
externality, and is therefore interesting for public policy. Apart from the ear-
lier works already mentioned, insightful models and policy recommendations
where developed by Frank (1985, 1999, 2005), Jaramillo and Moizeau (2003),
Luttmer (2005), Moav and Neeman (2008) and Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2008).
3 Modeling positionality
To account for relative effects, most generally, an utility function of the
following form is needed (compare Clark et al. 2008):
U = U(U1(x), U2(x|x∗), U3(z)). (1)
Here x is the amount of an arbitrary good and x∗ is some reference level.
U1(x) is the utility gained from the absolute value of x, U2(x|x∗) is the utility
obtained from the relative value of x compared to x∗, and U3(z) captures
other factors that might influence the utility.
Using the survey experimental method described in the next section, we
can reasonably assume that U3(z) is the same across decision alternatives.2
We can therefore assume that an individual prefers the alternative that max-
imizes
U = U(U1(x), U2(x|x∗)). (2)
To carry out calculations, we have to assume a more specific functional
form of U . In the literature both a multiplicative form, U = x1−γ( xx∗ )
γ and
an additive from, U = (1 − δ)x + δ(x − x∗), have been used. See Alpizar
et al. (2005). In both cases the parameter γ or δ can be interpreted as the
degree of positionality, as it gives the weight the relative term has in the
utility. Since there is no clear evidence in favor for one or the other and in
order to make comparisons easier, results will be presented for both forms.
Given these functional forms (or similar ones), γ or δ can be calculated if
two pairs of x and x∗ are found between which the individual is indifferent.
In that case we have an equation
U(xA, x
∗
A) = U(xB, x
∗
B) (3)
that can be solved for γ or δ, yielding
γ =
log xAxB
log
x∗A
x∗B
and δ =
xA − xB
x∗A − x∗B
. (4)
The required pairs of x and x∗ can be obtained by conducting the survey
experiment described in section 5.
2This is still an idealization as the ceteris paribus assumption in the survey experiment
is impossible to take completely seriously.
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4 Data collection
The survey was conducted in two separate areas of Uganda, one rural and
one urban. The rural area was the administrative village Nvubu, Kyasi-
imbi parish, Nabigasa sub county, Kyotera county, Rakai District in central
Uganda. Nvubu consists of two natural villages and the surrounding coun-
tryside. There were 114 households in Nvubu, spread over a fairly large
area. To avoid potential problems with sampling every household in that
village was surveyed. As aid I had a list of residents obtained by the village
chairman. Since the list was from 2004, it was updated with the help of the
chairman. Furthermore the village chairman introduced me to every house-
hold in the village and explained that I am a student doing research. Special
mention was made of that I am not religiously or corporately affiliated and
that I’m no sponsor. I asked to talk to the household head or his or her
spouse.
Nvubu was chosen as a fairly normal village in central Uganda, based
on socio-economic statistics provided by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
In particular, I got access to some data collected in the Uganda National
Household Survey 2009/2010. A summary of the methodology and the find-
ings of that survey can be found in UBOS (2010). It is however not claimed
that this village is representative for rural Uganda, or even only the central
region or the Rakai district as a whole. This study should therefore more
be considered as a case study. During the study I found out that the village
differs in two significant ways from the average other village in the region: It
had become the home of an unusual number of Rwandan refugees and it had
a missionary hospital fairly close.3 However, it could also be argued that
positionality is something that should be relatively constant across a given
culture and not subject to too much noise.
The urban part of the survey was conducted in the capital city Kampala.
The survey area was naturally limited by a swamp to the north and west and
by a hill in the south. It consisted of the urban districts Soya, Bunga, Bunga
Hill, Buziga and Buziga Hill. The area was big enough to include both low-,
middle- and high-income neighbourhoods. There were about 900 households
in the survey area and during the data collection we moved from west to
east, asking to talk to one knowledgeable household member in every 8th
household. When I could not find anyone to talk to in a certain household,
I moved on to the next one. To ensure that people were at home, I tried to
do most of the surveying during the late afternoon and evening and during
the weekends.
Since few people in the countryside speak good enough English, the sur-
vey was conducted with the help of an interpreter native in the local language
3Sampling households from several different villages was considered, but the potential
noise given the sample size, was estimated to be too large.
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Luganda. As a recent bachelor graduate growing up in Kampala, he also had
a good level of English. We moved from household to household together
and I was always present during the interview and experiment. The same
interpreter was used in Kampala and Nvubu in order to avoid an interpreter
bias. However, sometimes we had to use English in Kampala resulting in a
possible translation bias.
Since in questionnaires and survey experiments, framing is of high impor-
tance (see for example Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) special attention was
paid to this. To minimize potential influences that might biase the results,
I asked to speak to each person in a private environment without anyone
listening. Furthermore, I paid strong attention to what information we gave
and the phrasing of sentences. To ensure that everyone was treated in the
same way, a complete script of what was to be said was used. The script
was written first by me in English, then translated into Luganda by the in-
terpreter and then checked by several other persons. I was always present
during the sessions and checked that there were not any large deviations
from the script. In a first attempt we followed the script closely, when the
interviewee did not understand, the relevant part of the script was then read
again. First when there still were problems after this, the interpreter would
try to explain it in a slightly different way.
The interview and experiment took about 20 to 30 minutes with each
person. Each one was first asked a set of background questions, then we did
the survey experiment consisting of three scenarios: Income, education and
weddings in that order. Lastly, we played a variant of a trust game.4 The
survey experiment and its scenarios are presented in detail below.
It was not a problem to convince people to participate. Two households
in Nvubu did not want to take part in the study and in Kampala about 9 of
10 households were willing to take part.
The complete questionnaire (English version), including the scenarios
that where read out to everyone, can be found in the appendix. The complete
dataset is available upon request.
5 The survey experiment
The main part of the questionnaire was a survey experiment consisting of
three scenarios: Income, education and weddings. In each scenario the re-
spondent had to make series of hypothetical choices that would reveal his
degree of positionality.
4The trust game is excluded from this report, and should mainly be seen as a fun and
interesting way to compensate people for their time. We did not inform participants that
they would be able to earn money through this game at the start of the interview, as we
felt this might bias responses. (However most people in Nvubu probably knew about this
during the last days of our study.)
5
A few things should be said about the choice of scenarios and their con-
struction. Before the main survey was conducted I did a series of open inter-
views and tried out the phrasing of questions in a pilot study, conducted in
the Hoima district, Kampala and Kyotera. This lead to major modifications
of how the survey experiment was constructed.
The interviews were mainly aimed at determining what goods might be
positional and what peoples reference groups are. While there are several
things that obviously are positional amongst the middle class in Kampala,
like hairstyling at the inner-city saloons or cell phones among the young and
clothing, these comparisons do not seem very relevant for the poor rural
people that make up most of Uganda’s population. In the villages people
are subsistence farmers and spend most of their little income on either food,
maintenance of their farm, education, health care and ceremonies. Since
health care and food most likely is not positional and since I could not find
large hints of any money spent on the farms in a positional way, I decided
to survey education and ceremonies. Further, income was included as a
benchmark and for comparison with other studies.
For relative comparisons, a crucial question is relative to whom. In gen-
eral people compare themselves to people close to them, but there is some
evidence on that people can choose whom they compare themselves to (Clark
et al., 2008). Senik (2009) has found that peoples subjective well-being
is influenced very differently by the average income of different reference
groups. Therefore, some effort was made to find out what are peoples refer-
ence groups. When posed the direct question “In general, who do you com-
pare yourself to?”, people in the villages almost animously mentioned their
neighbours or the village. In Kampala however, the interviewees responded
considerably more varied, mentioning friends, co-workers and various other
groups. I decided to set the reference group in the scenarios to the village in
Nvubu, and the city in Kampala, because these where the smallest groups
that included all the groups that people mentioned.
Furthermore, the absolute magnitude of the numbers in the scenarios,
was chosen to be somewhat above what is normal in the village. The same
numbers where retained in Kampala, although they are considerable below
the norm, in order to make rural-urban comparisons easier.
The final scenarios used together with the alternatives are shown in table
1. Also shown is the implied degree of positionality at indifference between A
and each of the B alternatives, calculated as in equation 4. The alternatives
differ only in what the responded has and what the average other person in
the reference group has. Respondents where asked which society they would
prefer, choosing between A and B1. Unless the respondent preferred A, he
would be asked to choose between A and B2 and so on until he chose A or
B5 was reached. In this way a range for the degree of positionality can be
determined. If for example a respondent prefers B2 to A this implies that
δ > 0.125, and if he prefers A to B3 in the next question we can conclude
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Own Average δ γ
Income A 300,000 400,000
Income B1 300,000 200,000 0 0
Income B2 275,000 200,000 0.125 0.126
Income B3 250,000 200,000 0.25 0.263
Income B4 220,000 200,000 0.4 0.447
Income B5 180,000 200,000 0.6 0.737
Education A 6 8
Education B1 6 4 0 0
Education B2 5.5 4 0.125 0.126
Education B3 5 4 0.25 0.263
Education B4 4.4 4 0.4 0.447
Education B5 3.6 4 0.6 0.737
Wedding A 6,000,000 8,000,000
Wedding B1 6,000,000 4,000,000 0 0
Wedding B2 5,500,000 4,000,000 0.125 0.126
Wedding B3 5,000,000 4,000,000 0.25 0.263
Wedding B4 4,400,000 4,000,000 0.4 0.447
Wedding B5 3,600,000 4,000,000 0.6 0.737
Table 1: The scenarios used in the survey experiment. “Own” and “Average” amounts in Ugandan
shilling (UGX) (1USD ≈ 2500 UGX at the time), except education which is in years.
that 0.25 > δ > 0.125.
To minimize potential ordering effects, the alternatives were presented
pairwise and without any numbering. An example can be seen in the ap-
pendix, section A.2.4. After 50 households in Nvubu, the order of the A and
B alternatives was switched. Regression analysis shows that their order had
no influence on choices. I did not control for ordering effects that might be
due to the ordering of B alternatives in relation to each other or the ordering
of scenarios.
As already mentioned, close detail was paid to the phrasing of the sce-
narios. The full script that was read to respondents can be found in the
appendix, section A.2.
6 Descriptive results
A total of 232 households were surveyed, 112 in Nvubu and 120 in Kampala.
59% of the respondents were women. The mean age was 33 years and the
median age 28. In the village the average person had 5 years of education and
in the city 10. 62% belonged to the main ethnic group of the central region,
Baganda, and 51% were Catholic, which is the main religion. This could be
compared to the total Ugandan population of about 30 million people, with
51% females, an median age of 15 years, 16% Baganda, 40% Catholics and
a median level of education below 7 years. (UBOS, 2010)
Table 2 shows the choices made in the survey experiment. Most people
did not show any positionality. Only 33% have a degree of positionality above
zero for Income. For education and weddings the corresponding percentages
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Income Education Wedding
Freq. Cum. Freq. Cum. Freq. Cum.
γ < 0 δ < 0 0.673 0.673 0.797 0.797 0.704 0.704
0 < γ < 0.126 0 < δ < 0.125 0.217 0.889 0.113 0.910 0.153 0.857
0.126 < γ < 0.263 0.125 < δ < 0.25 0.049 0.938 0.018 0.928 0.020 0.877
0.263 < γ < 0.447 0.25 < δ < 0.4 0.027 0.965 0.014 0.941 0.025 0.902
0.447 < γ < 0.737 0.4 < δ < 0.6 0.022 0.987 0.041 0.982 0.030 0.931
γ > 0.737 δ > 0.6 0.013 1.000 0.018 1.000 0.069 1.000
n=226 n=222 n=203
Table 2: Choices made in the survey experiment.
Income Education Wedding
rural urban rural urban rural urban
γ < 0 δ < 0 0.851 0.513 0.914 0.692 0.784 0.624
0 < γ < 0.126 0 < δ < 0.125 0.056 0.361 0.038 0.180 0.098 0.208
0.126 < γ < 0.263 0.125 < δ < 0.25 0.037 0.059 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.040
0.263 < γ < 0.447 0.25 < δ < 0.4 0.028 0.025 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.040
0.447 < γ < 0.737 0.4 < δ < 0.6 0.009 0.034 0.019 0.060 0.029 0.030
γ > 0.737 δ > 0.6 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.017 0.078 0.059
Fisher’s exact test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.028
Table 3: Frequency distributions of choices made in the survey experiment, separated into rural
and urban. P-values of Fisher’s exact test comparing the rural to urban distributions below.
are 20% and 30%. A relatively large proportion of 7% always choose the
positional alternative in the wedding scenario. The percentage with very
low positionality is similar to Akay et al. (2011), but somewhat larger.
In the table invalid responses are excluded. After their first choice and
after their last, we always asked respondents of why they chose the way they
did. In this way we could assess if respondents did understand the scenarios.
Responses where it was obvious that the respondent did not understand
were excluded. Furthermore, responses of the type “I can’t handle so much
money.”, “Little education is good.” or “Weddings are a waste.”, that would
imply that the respondent always prefers the positional alternative, but for
nonpositional reasons, were also excluded. Throughout this report invalid
responses will be excluded. However, results including them are presented
in appendix B.1.
In order to assess rural-urban differences, table 3 shows the frequency
distributions of responses separately for Nvubu and Kampala. The urban
responses where considerably more positional for income and education and
more positional for weddings. The significance of these differences can be
assessed with the p-values for Fisher’s exact test of the null hypothesis of
equal distribution, presented in the last row of the table.
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Income Education Wedding
γ¯sk
standard 0.0573 0.0553 0.0954
rural 0.0425 0.0386 0.1081
urban 0.0704 0.0743 0.1040
δ¯sk
standard 0.0532 0.0499 0.0879
rural 0.0393 0.0350 0.0990
urban 0.0653 0.0668 0.0957
γ¯b
standard 0.0511 (0.0033) 0.0454 (0.0043) 0.1198 (0.0077)
rural 0.0398 (0.0058) 0.0279 (0.0060) 0.1170 (0.0188)
urban 0.0658 (0.0075) 0.0655 (0.0087) 0.1350 (0.0151)
δ¯b
standard 0.0469 (0.0029) 0.0402 (0.0037) 0.1023 (0.0064)
rural 0.0354 (0.0050) 0.0241 (0.0050) 0.0987 (0.0160)
urban 0.0614 (0.0064) 0.0590 (0.0076) 0.1176 (0.0127)
Table 4: Spearman-Karber estimates for the mean degree of positionality. Below, Bootstrap
estimates of the mean degree of positionality with case resampling, N = 10000. Bootstrap standard
error in parentheses.
7 Degree of positionality
To evaluate how important positional concerns were in the sample, the mean
degree of positionality is calculated in this section. Since by construction it is
only known in which interval each persons degree of positionality lies, there
is no definite way to do this.
One way to estimate the mean, which does not rely on any distributional
assumptions except that it assumes the values to be distributed symmet-
rically around the midpoint of each interval, is to use the midpoint of the
intervals weighted by the relative proportion of people in the respective in-
terval. This is also called the Spearman-Karber method, and it’s found to
be a good method to estimate means with interval censored data. (Hamilton
et al. 1977)
The Spearman-Karber estimator is
ρ¯ =
5∑
i=1
(Pi − Pi+1)(ρi+1 + ρi)/2 (5)
where Pi is the proportion of people choosing the scenario B‘i’ over A and
ρi is the implied degree of positionality for scenario B‘i’.
To make these calculations we have to assume upper and lower bounds
for ρ. We assume that everyone has at least ρ = 0 and that no one attains
the upper bond ρ = 1. In the appendix (B.1) ρ¯ is also reported for a variety
of other assumptions in order to check robustness.
Table 4 shows the mean degree of positionality for income, education and
weddings.
Another way to calculate the average degree of positionality is to use the
coefficients estimated in the interval regressions below in combination with
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a bootstrap technique.5 The simplest way to do this is just to resample the
people and use the coefficients to calculate the mean degree of positionality
for every sample.6 Estimates are presented in table 4 below the Spearman-
Karber estimates.
It can be seen in the table that weddings are significantly more positional
than income or education and that there are significant differences between
the rural and urban sample for income and education, but not for weddings.
8 Econometric analysis
Since the data are interval censored, i.e. we only know an interval in which
each data point lies, the interval regression technique is used for the econo-
metric analysis. Table 5 shows a comparison of four different regression meth-
ods for each of the scenarios in the survey experiment and table 6 defines the
explanatory variables used. The regression models exhibit multicollinarity
and coefficients and p-values should therefore be carefully interpreted. Es-
pecially the “kampala”, “cooperation”, “sincome”, “swealth”, “education” and
“nonbantu” variables are correlated. The specification presented includes
all variables that had some amount of explanatory power. However, the
explanatory power of the models is still very low.
Throughout this section, the interval regressions presented use the inter-
vals of the additive degree of positionality, δ, that are implied by the choices
in the survey experiments as dependent variable. Results are similar for the
multiplicative model with γ.
5The regressions “Int1” from table 5 were used for the coefficients.
6An explanation of different bootstrap methods can be found in most econometric
textbooks. See for example Davidson and MacKinnon (2009).
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In table 5, regression “Int1” is an interval regression assuming a normal
distributed dependent variable implemented by Stata’s “intreg” command.
Its coefficients can be directly interpreted like those for OLS. However the
dependent variable does not seem normally distributed and the regressions
“Int2” therefore fit a general Weibull distribution to the data and do the
interval regression based on this. This distribution is a reasonable fit for
income, and okay for education, but not good for weddings. Basically, it en-
hances the influence of the positional people, by considering them less likely.
“Int2” was implemented in R. “Opro” is an ordered probit regression and
it is presented because it is independent of the specific form of the utility
function assumed, which might seem rather arbitrary. Furthermore, since
most respondents are not very positional, and since the repeated choices be-
tween the increasingly positional scenarios might be subject to biases due to
learning, tiredness and heuristics, a collapsed probit regression is presented.
“Prob” uses a binary dependent variable that is zero unless there is some
positionality.
An important predictor is wealth. The wealth variable was constructed
differently in Nvubu and Kampala. In the village, people were asked how
much land and animals they own and these numbers were converted into
a monetary value using current market prices. In Kampala the property
of each person was rated on a scale from 1 to 5. These numbers were then
converted into approximate monetary values of houses and plots of that type
in the area. Together this was used as a proxy for wealth. The regression
coefficients for wealth and their significance depend on how high the houses
in Kampala were valuated. Higher valuation results in higher significance,
therefore conservative valuations were used.
As can be seen in table 5, results differ between the models and should
therefore be interpreted with care. However, the signs of coefficients and
relative effects are similar. “Int1” seems to be the most conservative method,
mostly showing lower significance than the others. A few observations can be
made. Education seems to be highly positively correlated with positionality
for education and weddings. The minority Christian religions seem more
positional in income and education than the Catholics. People who think
they deserve more, are more positional in income. Cooperation with others
in society is negatively correlated with positionality. There is little evidence
of gender differences. Wealth and income have little effects on their own, only
for weddings, an higher income is related to higher positionality. The “single”
coefficient is always positive, but only significant for the probit regressions
on education. The Int1 coeffecients can be interpreted directly, so for all
three scenarios, being of a minority Christian religion is associated with the
largest increase in positionality. For example 0.088 larger than other peoples
for income, all else equal.
To evaluate the rural-urban differences, a series of regressions on income
positionality including the Kampala dummy are conducted. They are pre-
12
variable description mean
age age in years 32.79
age2 age squared 1278.64
kampala 1 if Kampala, otherwise 0 0.51
education education in years 7.89
sex 1 if female, otherwise 0 0.59
child 1 if children in household, otherwise 0 0.91
lichurch 1 if attend church less than twice a month, otherwise 0 0.14
moslem 1 if moslem, otherwise 0 0.10
pentec 1 if religion is pentecostal, otherwise 0.13
protest 1 if religion is protestant, otherwise 0 0.18
catholic omitted religion category 0.51
ochrist 1 if religion is other christian, otherwise 0.08
swealth wealth in UGX divided by 10, 000, 000 5.82
sincome income in UGX divided by 100, 000 7.58
deserve answer to deserve question (11c), 4 = very strong to 0 = very little 2.56
single 1 if single, 0 otherwise 0.45
cooperation 1 if answer is yes to cooperation question (9 in questionaire), 0 otherwise 0.59
nonbantu 1 if not of bantu people, 0 otherwise 0.05
east 1 if belongs to a tribe originally from the east, otherwise 0 0.09
north 1 if belongs to a tribe originally from the north, otherwise 0 0.04
rwandese 1 if Rwandese, otherwise 0 0.09
munyankole 1 if Munyankole, otherwise 0 0.07
othwest 1 if belongs to a tribe originally from the west (not Munyankole), otherwise 0 0.07
foreign 1 if foreign origin (not rwandese), otherwise 0 0.10
muganda omitted ethnicity cathegory 0.62
Table 6: Definition of explanatory variables.
sented in table 7. The normal interval regression was used since it seems to
be the most conservative and is straight forward to interpret. Since Uganda
is one of the most ethnically fractionalized countries in the world (Alesina,
2003), it is important to include controls for the different ethnical groups.
The Kampala dummy survives the inclusion of ethnicity dummies and most
other controls, but if any of “cooperation”, “education” or “swealth” are in-
cluded this lowers its coefficient.7 The effects of wealth and education are
largely collinear, but the effect of cooperation is separate. Thus, if all three
are included in a regression model the Kampala coefficient is significantly
diminished. This implies that while people in Kampala are more positional,
this has to with that they are wealthier or are exposed to competitive higher
education and can depend less on the average person in their surroundings.
These effects are similar for education (see appendix B.2), but for the wed-
ding scenario the Kampala dummy is never significant.
7The inclusion of “swealth” leads to the omission of some 30 people, due to missing
values. This is unfortunate, but the omission does not change much ceteris paribus, except
a larger coefficient for “kampala” and a smaller one for “child”.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
kampala 0.026* 0.033* 0.039** 0.033* 0.031. 0.025 0.016
(0.072) (0.054) (0.029) (0.075) (0.101) (0.244) (0.461)
age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.796) (0.841) (0.610) (0.831) (0.380) (0.229)
age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.859) (0.888) (0.727) (0.905) (0.415) (0.304)
sex -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005
(0.355) (0.373) (0.328) (0.454) (0.807) (0.757)
child 0.057** 0.058** 0.053* 0.058** 0.030 0.025
(0.032) (0.032) (0.052) (0.030) (0.345) (0.435)
single 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.006
(0.426) (0.527) (0.606) (0.512) (0.629) (0.718)
lichurch 0.026 0.030. 0.024 0.030. 0.034. 0.027
(0.229) (0.166) (0.280) (0.162) (0.133) (0.233)
moslem -0.019 -0.021 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022
(0.453) (0.419) (0.373) (0.397) (0.473) (0.425)
pentec 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.010 0.006
(0.423) (0.342) (0.389) (0.380) (0.712) (0.837)
protest 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.029. 0.025
(0.267) (0.206) (0.229) (0.262) (0.177) (0.242)
ochrist 0.082*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.094*** 0.092***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
deserve 0.013** 0.013** 0.012** 0.013** 0.016** 0.015**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.040) (0.036) (0.014) (0.018)
sincome -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.779) (0.707) (0.590) (0.561) (0.096) (0.072)
east -0.033 -0.032 -0.033 -0.041. -0.038.
(0.226) (0.231) (0.222) (0.161) (0.187)
north 0.010 0.015 0.009 0.033 0.039
(0.800) (0.710) (0.817) (0.479) (0.406)
rwandese 0.019 0.028 0.017 0.031 0.039
(0.750) (0.647) (0.777) (0.617) (0.528)
munyankole -0.035 -0.031 -0.033 -0.029 -0.022
(0.210) (0.276) (0.241) (0.330) (0.467)
othwest -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014
(0.663) (0.652) (0.733) (0.642) (0.656)
foreign -0.006 -0.015 -0.000 -0.015 -0.023
(0.908) (0.785) (0.994) (0.794) (0.689)
cooperation -0.025. -0.029.
(0.151) (0.140)
education 0.002 0.000
(0.277) (0.830)
swealth 0.003** 0.003*
(0.040) (0.067)
cons 0.033*** -0.081. -0.077 -0.070 -0.092. -0.104. -0.099.
(0.001) (0.182) (0.209) (0.257) (0.144) (0.112) (0.139)
lnsigma -2.226*** -2.270*** -2.278*** -2.283*** -2.278*** -2.295*** -2.299***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aic -37.164 -30.672 -22.092 -22.147 -18.579 -24.845 -20.284
N 226.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 224.000 201.000 200.000
Table 7: Series of regressions assessing the effect of “kampala” on income positionality, using normal
interval regression. P-vales are given in parenthesis. Significance levels: ***=0.01, **=0.05, *=0.1
and .=0.2.
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9 Discussion
The results differ from other studies on positionality in that the found mean
degree of positionality is lower. Even in the study closest to this one, Akay et
al. (2011), conducted in rural Ethiopia, one of the poorest areas of the world,
the marginal degree of positionality was found to be as large as 0.158 for
income. They used the additive utility function and the Spearman-Karber
estimator, so this value should therefore be compared to δ¯sk = 0.039 for
Nvubu. Even compared to the considerably richer Kampala sample with
δ¯sk = 0.065, their estimate is high. This is rather disturbing, since wealth
and positionality are considered to be positively associated.
The difference might be due to they way in which this survey was con-
ducted. Since both the Nvubu and Kampala sample show similarly low
degrees of positionality, it is unlikely that I happened to survey a unusually
tight-knit rural community.
Scale effects can not explain the lower degree of positionality. The ab-
solute value of the numbers used in the income scenario is lower than in
studies in developed countries. People choosing the positional society are
almost implicitly saying they’d be okay with letting everyone else starve just
so that they are better off. 200.000 UGX is about 80 USD. However the
amounts used by Akay et al. (2011) for Ethopia lie as low as 26 USD a
month. Furthermore, for the education and wedding scenarios the values
were not particularly low and positionality is similarly low.
An explanation might be, that the framing I used in the scenarios differs
slightly from other studies and that my scenarios might not isolate concerns
for relative position as well as previously used ones. Mainly, I did not ex-
plicitly state that respondents should not consider what society is best as a
whole, but only asked them to consider what society would be best for them.
However, Akat et al. (2011) also do not explicitly state this.
Further, the survey was conducted in a private and personal manner.
People had to tell their answers directly to me and the interpreter. This
might bias choices into the unpositional direction, since people might care
about being perceived as good and altruistic, or they might think that the
unpositional society is the right answer or the answer that I want to hear.
However Carlsson et al. (2007) used the same survey method in Vietnam
and got a mean degree of positionality of 0.28.
It seems as if part of the explanation for the low positionality is cultural.
The Buganda society might very well be the least positional society stud-
ied so far. Sub-Saharan African cultures are fundamentally different from
western, but African cultures also differ considerably from each other. In
general they are traditionally oriented with strong survival values. See for
example the World Values Survey Association (2009). Their cultures are
non-individualistic and more group-orientated (Triandis, 1995). Herein part
of the explanation for the low positionality may lie. After their first and
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last choice for each scenario, we asked the respondents why they chose the
way they did. 29%, resp. 53% and 44% of those choosing completely un-
positional said that they preferred to be in a richer society, because they
expected others to help them (income scenario), or because they expected
to learn from others (education scenario) or because they expected others to
contribute a lot to the wedding (wedding scenario). A large proportion also
stressed the opportunities that a richer society offers.
Even for weddings, which were roughly twice as positional as income or
education, the degree of positionality is still very low. This suggests that
the largest part of the explanation to why even poor people spend so much
on a wedding, is not some concern for relative position. Weddings in rural
Uganda are largely a social event, where the whole village participates and
contributes. Maybe psychological theories of mental accounting or compen-
sation can better explain the large amount of money spent on weddings in
rural Uganda (see for example Thaler, 1999). People might use these rarely
occurring happy ceremonies as a way to balance out or compensate for all
the hardships of their daily lives.
As already mentioned, the regression analysis presented should be in-
terpreted with care. Since a high degree of positionality is very uncommon
and the sample size is rather small, the regressions are largely influenced by
the few positional values. This can by seen by for example the large change
in estimators when including a dummy for the first 19 observations in the
regressions. Furthermore there is high collinearity between the explanatory
variables, especially between Kampala, Education and Income. Besides, the
inferences about significance of coefficients depends to a high degree on the
model assumptions and regression techniques and specifications used. All
models have very low predictive power, indicating that important predictive
variables are missing.
A further complication arises from the fact that it is far from evident
that choices in hypothetical scenarios reflect real-life preferences. This is
discussed in Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001). Ordering effects and framing
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981) might even further bias this study in different
directions. Solnick (1998) and their results indicate substantial ordering
effects. Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) also found significant ordering
effects. Only ordering regarding the placement of A and B scenarios was
controlled for in the surveys.
10 Concluding remarks
In this study a survey experimental method was used to examine positional
concerns in two areas of rural and urban Uganda. Relative concerns were
measured along three dimensions: Income, education and weddings. Posi-
tionality is considerably lower than found in other studies and this is at least
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partly attributed to the specific Buganda culture. Weddings are found to be
about twice as positional as income or education, but positional concern for
weddings is still low.
Differences between the rural and urban areas are substantial, and sup-
port is found for the proposition that these differences are largely related to
the higher wealth of the urban population. However, the still relatively low
positional concerns of the urban population suggest that traditional values
do not decline as fast as one might expect once people start to live a more
western lifestyle.
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A Questionaire
A.1 Background questions
1. How many adults and how many children live in this household?
2. What is your marital status? (Alternatives: married, divorced, widowed,
single)
3. How long have you lived in Kampala?*8
4. What is your religion?
5. How often do you normally attend church in one month?
6. What is your ethnicity?
7. How many years of education have you had?
8. Are you currently involved in any community organization?
9. Have you ever, during the past five years, gotten together with people in your
community in order to solve a common problem?
10. How many acres of land does this household own?**9
11. What animals and how many of them does this household rear?**
12. How much money do you earn in this household from all the work you do
and all the land and animals you own?**
13. What is the total monthly income in your household?*
14. How strongly do you agree with the following statements? (Alternatives:
very strong, strong, moderately, little, very little)
a) Generally speaking, most people can be trusted.
b) It is important to be ahead of others.
c) I deserve more than the average other person in my society.
15. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life? (Alternatives: very
satisfied, satisfied, so-so, unsatisfied, very unsatisfied)
16. How healthy are you currently? (Alternatives: very healthy, healthy, so-so,
unhealthy, very unhealthy)*
17. How often have you borrowed or given money to friends and family (outside
of your household) during the last month? (Alternatives: 0 times, 1-5 times,
6-10 times, 11-15 times, more than 15 times)*
18. How often have you borrowed or received money from friends and family
(outside of your household) during the last month? (Alternatives: 0 times,
1-5 times, 6-10 times, 11-15 times, more than 15 times)*
8Starred questions were asked only in Kampala.
9Double-starred questions were asked only in Nvubu.
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A.2 Scenarios
A.2.1 Income
We are going to present you with different pairs of imaginary societies. You are to
choose which one you would prefer to live in. The societies differ only in how large
your monthly income is and how large the average income of other people in your
village is.10 Everything else is assumed to be exactly the same.11
The monthly income is the monetary value in shillings of all the things you produce
in your household, including any money you get as payment for work or services
you perform.
*On the paper in front of you, each circle represents one imaginary society. In the
society to the right, you would have an income of 300,000 shs a month, while the
average, the typical, other person in your village would have an income of 400,000
shs a month. This means that you would earn 100,000 shs less than average.
On the other hand, in the society to the left, you’d have an inomce of 300,000
shs a month, while the average other person in your village would have an income
of 200,000 shs a month. This means that you would earn 100,000 shs more than
average.
Which of these societies would you prefer to live in?
(If a question, repeat the relevant part above.)
(Wait for answer and ask only after first and last choice:) Why?
(If the left society is chosen, show next pair and explain exactly as above, starting
at *, otherwise stop.)
A.2.2 Education
We are again going to present you with different pairs of imaginary societies. This
time, you are to choose which one you’d prefer your child to live in. If you don’t
have children, try to imagine you had. The societies differ only in how many years
of education your child gets, and how many years of education the average other
child in that society gets. Everything else is assumed to be exactly the same.
In the imaginary societies education is completely free of charge.
*On the paper in front of you, each circle represents one imaginary society. In
the society to the right, your child would get 6 years of education and the average
or typical other child would get 8 years of education. This means that your child
10Village was changed to city in Kampala.
11While this assumption is unrealtistic, it was used instead of the assumption that prices
are the same and that some list of other things are the same, since this seemed to distract
people when I tried it during the pilot study.
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would get 2 years less education that the average other child in society.
On the other hand, in the left society, your child would get 6 years of education,
while the average other child would get 4. This means that your child would get 2
years more education that the average other child in society.
Which of these societies would you prefer your child to live in?
(If a question, repeat the relevant part above.)
(Wait for answer and ask only after first and last choice:) Why?
(If the left society is chosen, show next pair and explain exactly as above, starting
at *, otherwise stop.)
A.2.3 Wedding
We are again going to present you with different pairs of imaginary societies. This
time, you are to choose which one you would prefer your grandchild to live in. If
you don’t have a grandchild, try to imagine you had. The societies differ only in
how much the wedding of your grandchild did cost, and in how much the average
other wedding in society did cost.
In the imaginary societies, your grandchild’s wedding is fully paid for by an external
donor.
*On the paper in front of you, each circle represents one imaginary society. In
the society to the right, the wedding of your grandchild would cost 6 M, 6 mil-
lion shillings, and the average other wedding in that society would cost 8 million
shillings. This means that the wedding of your grandchild would cost 2 million
shillings less that the average other wedding.
On the other hand, in the left society, the wedding of your grandchild would cost
6 million shilling, and the average other wedding in your village would cost 4 mil-
lion shilling. This means that the wedding of your grandchild would cost 2 million
shillings more that the average other wedding.
Which of these societies would you prefer your grandchild to live in?
(If a question, repeat the relevant part above.)
(Wait for answer and ask only after first and last choice:) Why?
(If the left society is chosen, show next pair and explain exactly as above, starting
at *, otherwise stop.)
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A.2.4 Example
Below is an example of how the alternatives were presented.
        6             8
  omwana    abalala
        6             4
  omwana    abalala
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Income Education Wedding
standard 0.0532 0.0499 0.0879
including doubtful answers 0.0587 0.0673 0.1102
only rural including doubtful answers 0.0450 0.0492 0.1227
only urban including doubtful answers 0.0653 0.0730 0.1090
excluding first two research days 0.0461 0.0405 0.0848
upper limit at 2 0.0596 0.0585 0.1257
lower limit at -0.05 0.0444 0.0346 0.0810
trimmed off 0 and 1 0.0956 0.1175 0.0188
trimmed off 10% 0.0802 0.0558 0.0734
standard 0.0469 (0.0029) 0.0402 (0.0037) 0.1023 (0.0064)
large regression 0.0471 (0.0031) 0.0400 (0.0039) 0.1017 (0.0066)
including doubtful answers 0.0497 (0.0031) 0.0495 (0.0038) 0.1221 (0.0078)
only rural including doubtful answers 0.0391 (0.0057) 0.0368 (0.0053) 0.1164 (0.0165)
only urban including doubtful answers 0.0614 (0.0063) 0.0655 (0.0083) 0.1320 (0.0147)
excluding first two research days 0.0393 (0.0030) 0.0310 (0.0038) 0.0901 (0.0061)
Table 8: Robustness of the estimates for the median degree of positionality. Upper half Spearman-
Karber, below bootstrap. All estimates for additive utility (δ).
B Robustness
B.1 Degree of positionality
Table 8 shows the difference between different ways to calculate the mean degree of
positionality. The inclusion of doubtful answers, that is answers classed as invalid,
tends to bias the estimates upward. In the first two research days people answered
unusually positional.
B.2 Econometric analysis
Table 9 shows the same regressions as table 7 but with the choices in the education
scenario as dependent variable.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
kampala 0.034** 0.026. 0.030. 0.034. -0.002 0.005 -0.009
(0.041) (0.176) (0.137) (0.108) (0.912) (0.833) (0.693)
age 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.850) (0.979) (0.874) (0.978) (0.856) (0.932)
age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.892) (0.902) (0.834) (0.833) (0.922) (0.911)
sex -0.021 -0.024. -0.023. -0.016 -0.014 -0.012
(0.238) (0.181) (0.194) (0.361) (0.430) (0.491)
child 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007 -0.012 0.001
(0.893) (0.929) (0.861) (0.807) (0.725) (0.975)
single 0.021 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.005 0.014
(0.257) (0.329) (0.304) (0.241) (0.780) (0.436)
lichurch 0.035. 0.038. 0.041* 0.042* 0.032. 0.034.
(0.137) (0.113) (0.093) (0.069) (0.184) (0.146)
moslem 0.045. 0.047. 0.048* 0.041. 0.052* 0.040.
(0.121) (0.104) (0.096) (0.138) (0.078) (0.164)
pentec 0.012 0.018 0.019 0.010 0.020 0.007
(0.648) (0.513) (0.484) (0.719) (0.500) (0.819)
protest 0.003 0.007 0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012
(0.889) (0.769) (0.745) (0.818) (0.872) (0.603)
ochrist 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.099*** 0.114*** 0.099***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
deserve -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009. -0.005 -0.007
(0.288) (0.213) (0.224) (0.188) (0.475) (0.318)
sincome 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001. -0.001.
(0.952) (0.936) (0.863) (0.475) (0.130) (0.185)
east -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.028 -0.024
(0.503) (0.499) (0.436) (0.368) (0.434)
north 0.037 0.035 0.032 0.068. 0.050
(0.401) (0.434) (0.453) (0.177) (0.309)
rwandese 0.064 0.059 0.055 0.076 0.063
(0.345) (0.381) (0.396) (0.256) (0.337)
munyankole -0.005 -0.007 0.005 -0.021 -0.010
(0.880) (0.823) (0.879) (0.509) (0.754)
othwest -0.055* -0.055* -0.039 -0.072** -0.062*
(0.096) (0.094) (0.221) (0.037) (0.067)
foreign -0.050 -0.045 -0.025 -0.056 -0.033
(0.420) (0.466) (0.675) (0.358) (0.584)
cooperation 0.013 0.004
(0.505) (0.864)
education 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.002)
swealth 0.004*** 0.002.
(0.008) (0.174)
cons 0.025** 0.013 0.030 0.025 -0.038 0.023 -0.032
(0.035) (0.847) (0.666) (0.719) (0.575) (0.741) (0.653)
lnsigma -2.100*** -2.151*** -2.162*** -2.163*** -2.203*** -2.209*** -2.234***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aic -98.791 -95.706 -88.637 -87.082 -103.074 -102.657 -106.787
N 222.000 221.000 221.000 221.000 220.000 197.000 196.000
Table 9: Series of regressions assessing the effect of “kampala” on education positionality, us-
ing normal interval regression. P-vales are given in parenthesis. Significance levels: ***=0.01,
**=0.05, *=0.1 and .=0.2.
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